Accountability in legislative representation implies that candidates communicate to voters what they will do if elected, that information about actions once in office is available to constituents, that representatives are responsive to the preferences and demands of constituents, and that they are punished for lack of responsiveness. There is an inherent tension between party discipline and responsiveness by individual legislators to their constituents. A number of recent institutional reforms in Latin America have sought to increase individual responsiveness and accountability of legislators, even at the expense of party discipline. The most important of these are reforms that put in place mixed electoral systems combining single-member districts with proportional representation, and the adoption of public voting in legislatures. This paper draws on interviews with legislators and staff in Mexico, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Venezuela, as well as surveys of legislators in the first three countries and secondary sources, to examine the effects of recent reforms on legislative accountability.
representatives' ties to constituencies and in the information about legislators' actions, increase the premium on individual accountability among representatives.
Recent institutional reforms in many Latin American countries have altered the balance of resources that induce party discipline. Drawing on interview data with party leaders, legislators, and staff, surveys of legislators, and records of debates and votes, I illustrate how political elites regard these reforms, outline the strain they perceive between loyalty to party and responsiveness to constituents, and discuss the connection between these matters and the normative concept of democratic accountability. I posit that legislators are subject to increasing pressures from sources other than party leaders.
The paper proceeds as follows. I begin by noting some characteristics of the five countries where field research was conducted for this essay, the nature of the interviews, and what these imply for the conclusions presented. Next, I discuss the trade-off between individualism and party discipline, and its implications for accountability, as understood by students of comparative legislatures generally and in the literature on transitional democracies in Latin America. Then I discuss a series of recent institutional reforms in various Latin American countries aimed at encouraging legislative individualism in the name of enhancing accountability.
Next, I present accounts of how internal partisan decision making is organized, how legislative voting coalitions are constructed and maintained, and the conditions under which party discipline is violated. I then evaluate the relationship between institutional reforms and incentives for legislator independence from parties. I conclude by evaluating how the trend toward individualism affects legislative accountability.
Cases for field research and interview method
This essay relies on a variety of evidence to advance propositions about party discipline and legislative accountability, but it is exploratory in two important regards. The first is case selection. Although I draw on sources from a wider range of countries, the field research for this paper, conducted in 2000, was limited to five Latin American countries: Venezuela, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mexico, and Costa Rica. These cases were selected in part because of characteristics they share. 1 Parties in these five countries are noted for their centralization of authority and strong discipline, conditions that might generate unusual pressures to increase the individual accountability of legislators. These common characteristics present both a potential research asset and a liability. The focus on strong-party cases in this study helps to illuminate common currents across political reforms that otherwise might appear to be unrelated. We shall see that constitutional reforms in Venezuela, as well as reforms of electoral laws and of legislative procedures in a variety of countries, are all justified according to a similar rationale. The limitation, however, is that one must remain tentative about generalizing the conclusions from this study until field research on other cases is conducted (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 146-147) .
A second limitation of the study is that it is based on information drawn primarily from political elites. I examine the motivations for and against party discipline among legislators, but not what discipline, or its absence, means to citizens. The legislators interviewed reflect on who knows what about their actions, and how this affects their responsiveness to various pressures, but this material should be regarded cautiously. I check the politicians' accounts of factual matters against published accounts such as newspapers, legislative records, and electoral and voting data.
With respect to explanations of why politicians act as they do, asking multiple interview subjects the same questions offers some measure of validity, as do comparisons between my open-ended interview questions and survey data on similar issues provided by the Proyecto de Elites Latinoamericanas project.
The core interview protocol was the same across four of the five countries, with question wording and references to some of the specifics of legislative organization accommodated to each environment. The interview format for Venezuela was unique because interviews were conducted in between the dissolution of the constituent assembly, which served simultaneously as a legislature, in 1999, and the inauguration of the new Congress in 2000. The interview protocols are provided (in English translation) in Appendices B and C.
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Parties and individuals in comparative legislatures
Legislative representation is almost always and almost everywhere partisan, and legislative accountability is complicated by a basic tension between party discipline and individual responsiveness. In a nutshell, the problem is that unified collective action by its legislators is necessary for a party to pursue its collective goals, whether the goal is to implement policy or to capture state resources, but the discipline required for effective collective action can undermine individual legislators' responsiveness to their constituents. There is a trade-off between demanding that legislators tow the party line and allowing them flexibility to cultivate support by responding to diverse interests. This can be the case whether representation is geographically based, as in single-member district electoral systems, or ideologically or sectorally or patronclient based, as in many multimember systems.
The tension between collective and individual accountability is central to scholarship on legislative representation, both formal and empirical, and in all regions (Aldrich 1995; Cain Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Cox 1987) . Theories of parliamentary government emphasize that, so long as legislators value the stream of future benefits associated with sustaining the government, the collective responsibility of cabinets to assemblies places a premium on party and coalition discipline over individualism, (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Huber 1996) . Common to much of the empirical scholarship on legislatures is a normative preference for party unity in legislative voting as a necessary condition for accountability. A recent study of discipline throughout Europe opens with the premise that:
"The maintenance of a cohesive voting bloc inside a legislative body is a crucially important feature of parliamentary life. Without the existence of a readily identifiable bloc of governing politicians, the accountability of the executive to both legislature and voters falls flat. It can be seen, then, as a necessary condition for the existence of responsible party government" (Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999: 3) .
The case studies in the book, however, demonstrate that breaches of discipline are more common in legislative voting than the conventional wisdom on parliamentary systems would hold, and that such breaches are the results of demands for direct responsiveness by representatives' to their electoral constituencies, even when such responsiveness contradicts collective partisan objectives (Whitely and Seyd 1999; Lanfranchi and Luthi 1999) .
Two recent studies suggest a cross-national trend, broader in scope than legislative voting alone, to resolve the tension between partisan representation and direct responsiveness to citizens by moving toward the latter. Scarrow (2001) documents a rise in provisions for direct election of executives and local officials, as well as in initiatives and referenda, among OECD countries over the past three decades. She attributes these to citizens' decreasing increasing distrust of parties, and a preference for leaders "more likely to challenge party policies and to forge cross-party alliances" (p.661). In a parallel manner, but based on an entirely different set of cases, Barczak (2001) documents a sharp increase in provisions for, and the use of, direct democracy throughout Latin America. Similarly, she attributes this pattern to reformers' seizing on widespread popular dissatisfaction with political parties, and claims to strengthen responsiveness of policy to public demand (p.39). Scholarship on comparative institutions, then, widely acknowledges the tension between partisan and individualized accountability, and in a few cases has noted trends toward increases in the latter. For the most part, however, studies of legislatures in presidential systems, and in Latin America in particular, have been critical of individualized representation, demonstrating a normative bent toward strong parties capable of coordinating legislative actions. This position reflects a preoccupation among Latin Americanists about the marginalization of legislatures by powerful executives, but it is also rooted in a preference for collective partisan accountability behind a broad program of government (Linz 1994; Stepan and Skach 1992; Valenzuela 1994 ). Mainwaring and Scully (1996) , for example, provide a series of indicators by which party systems might be evaluated, arguing that highly institutionalized party systems are essential to democratic performance. Such systems, in turn, depend on strong parties -those with extensive grassroots organizations, coherent platforms, durable attachments among loyalists, and stable levels of voter support in the broader electorate. A central idea here, as in the literature on accountability in parliamentary systems reviewed above, is that strength in these aspects is necessary for parties to be able to offer citizens coherent choices over policy and, in turn, be judged by citizens in elections on the basis of past performance and the credibility and appeal of their promises for the future.
Much of the recent literature on Latin American democracy has occupied itself with identifying the conditions under which parties lack these properties. Ames (1994) argues that open list legislative elections in Brazil induce legislators to undervalue public goods, and thereby undermine the coherence of partisan platforms and accountability between citizens and their representatives. Coppedge (1994) , on the other hand, argues that closed list legislative elections in Venezuela, and national party organizations that dominated political resources and career opportunities, precluded the development of meaningful links between legislators and constituents, undermining accountability.
Other authors have similarly pointed toward characteristics of Latin American parties to explain accountability deficits. Gibson (1997) argues that the heterogeneity of interests among voters who traditionally supported Mexico's PRI and Argentina's Peronists encouraged the leaders of each party to abandon longstanding economic policy positions in the 1980s and 1990s.
3 Cameron (1997) points to the fragmentation of the Peruvian legislative party system and the internal weakness of the parties themselves as reasons for the legislature's dominance by President Fujimori in the 1990s. Weyland (1996 Weyland ( , 1997 blames regressive economic and social policy in Brazil on the failure of collective action by parties, which impedes the reform of a segmentalized and clientelistic state. Roberts (1995) 
Political reforms and individual accountability
Political reformers, as usual, appear little concerned with currents in academic opinion -in this case, with the normative emphasis on strong parties. A number of reform measures in recent years have aimed to disconnect legislators from national party leadership when this conflicts with responsiveness to local constituencies. Is there a common motivation behind reforms of this sort?
In the strong-party systems of Latin America, reform adherents describe popular disenchantment with disciplined parties directed by leaders who are insulated from punishment by voters. In many cases, moreover, both the strong discipline and the insulation of the top dogs are causally connected to a common source: closed-list proportional representation elections with centralized control over candidate nominations.
The basic problem can be described as follows. As a politician advances within the party leadership, her access to power and perks increases dramatically, but her electoral vulnerability decreases in a corresponding manner because leaders occupy the top positions on party electoral
lists. This mitigates the leadership's susceptibility to electoral punishment, even if their party as a whole loses electoral ground. As a result, the leaders who stand to gain the most from violating public trust and pillaging state resources stand to suffer the least electoral indignity if their party is punished. Rank-and-file politicians, whose heads are the first to roll in any partisan electoral setback, might object to being relegated to the marginal list positions that buffer their leaders, but would-be rebels face a serious collective action problem in revolting against their party leaders, because troublemakers are simply removed from the lists, or demoted to perilous, or even hopeless list positions, by the leadership.
This portrayal describes a key component of party discipline in all five of the countries in which field research was conducted for this paper, as well in other closed-list systems. 4 As the importance of electoral rules suggests, some dissatisfaction with strong-party systems has been channeled toward electoral reform, but others seek to enhance legislative transparency by dragging legislators' actions into the spotlight of public attention. All the reforms discussed in this section share the potential to shift the trade-off between partisan discipline and individual legislator flexibility toward the latter. I consider, in turn, the adoption of mixed electoral systems, constitutional changes in Venezuela, and public voting in legislatures.
Mixed electoral systems
Since the 1980s, mixed electoral systems, combining single-member districts (SMDs) with proportional representation (PR) in overarching districts, have been adopted in Bolivia, Guatemala, Panama, Venezuela, and Mexico. 5 The explicit goal of such reforms is most often to tighten the local constituent-legislator bond, even at the expense of discipline among national parties. 6 As part of an effort to resuscitate support for a discredited party system in the early 1990s, for example, the President's Commission on State Reform (COPRE) in Venezuela advocated the shift from close-list PR elections to SMD/PR on the grounds that the previous system:
"strengthened the party line, which is defined by the top party leaders and the tribunals of discipline responsible for its application. As a result, the legislators vote as the party dictates without attending to the demands and interests of voters in their regions …[whereas legislators elected under the proposed SMDs] ought to act in the interests of their electors, ought to attend to their demands, ought to respond to their mail, and will have to explain to their electors why they vote as they do in the deliberative body" (Rachadell 1991:207-8) .
The same motivation spurred the shift from pure closed-list PR election to SMD/PR in Bolivia in 1994 where the plummeting stature of political parties, evident in street protests as well as opinion polls, was understood as a demand from voters "that deputies should be known and Finally, although the empirical focus of this paper is on the Latin American cases, it is worth noting that the arguments made in that region resonate as well among SMD/PR advocates in Europe. Richard Katz (2001) describes the Italian electoral reform of 1994 as motivated by popular demands for alternation in government, and for "direct accountability of individual members of parliament to their electors. There was a desire to free the electorate from the confines of party labels and ideologies, and to allow electors to take into account the character, qualifications, and performance in office of individual candidates when casting their votes" (p.103). Further back historically, the "mother of mixed systems," in Germany, was distinguished by its advocates from the pre-war, Weimar system of closed list PR by its virtue of strengthening the connection between voters and individual representatives. Susan Scarrow writes that:
"German advocates of mixed-member rules argued that such rules would 'personalize' voters' choices by letting them choose individual representatives from small discricts -indeed, Germans still refer to their system as being an example of 'personalized PR,' a label that is meant to distinguish it from proportional systems that lack a nominal tier" p.63).
Venezuela's Constitution of 1999
Venezuela's 1999 Constitution also includes a number of new measures designed specifically to foster personal responsibility by legislators to their district constituencies. There is a four-year residency requirement for eligibility to run for the legislature from any given district or state, designed to ensure that representatives know firsthand the needs and preferences of district voters (Art.188). Legislators are obliged to "render accounts" of their activities each year in public forums (rendiciones de cuentas) in their districts, to explain and defend their behavior and their votes (Arts.197, 199) . All legislative votes are explicitly deemed matters of individual conscience for representatives, rather than matters of partisan obligation (Art.201). Finally, all elected officials are subject to recall elections, which can be initiated by petition of 10% of the voters in their districts (Art.72, 197) .
To the extent that forcing legislators to render accounts to their districts produces additional information for constituents about legislators' actions, its connection to the idea of accountability established in this essay is straightforward. More broadly, game theoretical analysis suggests that requiring individual representatives to explain votes increases the efficiency of electoral punishment for legislators otherwise inclined to ignore constituents' wishes, and in doing so enhances responsiveness at the individual level (Austen-Smith 1993). All these anticipated effects were articulated -albeit, without the game theory -by Venezuelan legislators in interviews. Ricardo Combellas, a constituent assembly delegate and opponent of President Chavez, describes the motivation behind the reforms as follows:
We wanted to eliminate partyarchy -not to eliminate it constitutionally, but in terms of norms, for the representative to respond more directly to the wants and needs of his constituents. His responsibility in parliament is personal -the Constitution says so -not to respond to a party but to his constituents. We established a rendering of accounts that didn't exist before … [and] a vote of conscience that wasn't there either … [In the past], the parties overwhelmed their representatives. They imposed the line, imposed the vote, imposed attitudes. We have tried to relax this and create a more fluid relationship between legislators and their constituents. Besides, a legislator now has to have lived at least the last four years in the region where he is elected. And we have recall elections. All this is to say that there are innovative constitutional reforms, very different from what we had before, but that we don't know how they're going to work. That much will require a cultural change, but what we did with the Constitution was important (Combellas).
Referring to the same set of provisions, chavista constitutional delegate, now deputy, Tarek
William Saab's enthusiasm is even more unrestrained: "A big space is opened where the parties used to have complete control, and power is completely realigned. I think that we have put organized society above the parties -that the organized people, the organized popular movement will have a chance now because these constitutional measures give them a chance" (Saab).
It is too early to determine how these provisions will be applied, or what their effects will be, but Chavez supporters and skeptics alike argue that their intent is to increase the personal accountability of politicians, even if this loosens the bonds of party.
Recorded legislative votes
A third reform with the potential to affect the visibility of individual legislators' actions, and thus to alter the balance between the pressures placed on them by local constituencies versus national parties, is the adoption of public voting within legislatures themselves. Electronic voting systems were adopted in the lower legislative chambers more or less concurrently with the return to democracy in the mid-1980s in Argentina and Brazil and in the 1990s in Chile. They have been in use in Mexico and Peru since 1998, and Nicaragua since 2000. 7 A system has been in place in Venezuela since 1997, but has not yet been used. 8 The same is true for Costa Rica's first-generation system, installed in the mid-1970s. See Table 1 .
[ interest group leaders, activists, and the like will register how legislators vote, or that constituents will pay attention. Without a record, however, the prospect is moot, and until recently, there was no record most of the time. The adoption of electronic voting means that records are being created in many places, and the existence of records opens the possibility that the information will enter into political discourse.
This prospect was explicitly on the minds of Peruvian legislators in 1998 as they considered the implications of switching from the traditional handraising method of voting to the electronic system, which had recently been installed as part of a broader government modernization plan. On September 24, in an effort to embarrass the pro-Fujimori majority on a motion related to a corruption investigation, the opposition demanded that the electronic voting machines be incorporated into standard legislative procedure:
The whole reason for electronic voting is so citizens know how their representatives voted, so [votes] can be publicly justified. It's an instrument of democracy and transparency, which is why Congress spent as much as it did [to have it installed], not so we can use it on some votes and not on others … What the country is going to notice is that the parliamentary majority is afraid that, through the Internet and other mechanisms, its votes on some matters will be made visible (Congreso de Peru 1998).
The opposition threatened procedural maneuvers designed to grind progress on all matters to a halt if the electronic system were not employed. The majority eventually broke ranks, with one of its members concurring on the matter of transparency and accountability: "One reason for this system is that it leaves a record of votes for current political analysts and for history, so that how each one of us voted is known; and those congresspersons that run for reelection, when they face the voters, they'll have to explain how it is that on each of the issues they voted as they did"
(Congreso de Peru 1998).
Soon after the old system was breached, the Peruvian Congress began posting records of all electronic votes on its website. Two parallels with the Venezuelan electoral reform discussed above merit comment. First, any increase in transparency this reform produced was insufficient to prop up a system poised to collapse under the weight of its own corruption. However, like the mixed electoral system in Venezuela, public voting in Peru survived the collapse of the old regime.
Summing up
The reforms discussed here were developed independently in various legislative environments, but a common thread running through them is the stated intention to strengthen the accountability of individual legislators to voters. At least in their rhetoric, Latin American political reformers in the 1990s have been critical of the principle of legislative party discipline on the grounds that it conflicts with the individual accountability they endorse.
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Institutional pressures on legislative behavior
Parties and discipline
All legislatures with which I am familiar are organized along party lines, meaning that party units are accorded rights over legislative resources, including representation on the organ that controls the legislative agenda, as well as whatever offices and staff are available. Party groups in Latin American legislatures are variously known as fracciones, bancadas, or grupos. 10 The norm among legislative party groups in Latin America is to meet at least weekly when the legislature is in session to discuss the upcoming agenda and to establish both whether there is to be a group position on each issue, and what those positions will be. Party groups are subordinate to national party organizations, and generally can be instructed by them as to how to vote on specific issues. 11 National party congresses invariably occur less frequently than legislative party group meetings, but national party executive committees generally have authority to establish the party line. There is frequently some overlap between membership on party executive committees and legislative groups, particularly among legislative group leaders. Many parties also retain disciplinary bodies, composed of national party leaders, which are authorized to impose sanctions on legislators who break discipline on votes where a party line has been established. Across all parties in the countries where I conducted interviews, there was consensus that most votes are matters of discipline. 12 In explaining the sources of intrapartisan divisions, interview subjects concurred that cohesiveness tends to be greater in smaller groups, where there is more homogeneity of opinion, but that this is offset by economies of scale that larger groups enjoy in providing benefits that induce loyalty among legislators. Benefits range from physical resources, like offices and staff, to committee assignments, to favorable treatment for private member bills and budgetary funds for individual legislators' chosen projects (de la Cruz,
Hernandez, Hurtado interviews).
Legislators from all parties could cite cases of indiscipline, and they offered various accounts for how, and how effectively, parties respond. Consistent with academic accounts, preChavez Venezuela appears to have produced nearly airtight discipline across the party spectrum (Coppedge 1994) . Combellas (interview) affirmed that in breaches of party discipline in legislative voting were rare in all parties, and that every instance -in state assemblies as well as at the national level -triggered expulsion by the national party organization. He noted, however, that the "conscience" provision in the 1999 Constitution (Art.201) may provide judicial protection for undisciplined politicians. Legislators in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and El Salvador all acknowledged the existence of procedures to provide for expulsion on grounds of indiscipline, but emphasized that less public and dramatic measures are generally preferred by party leaders.
In the latter two countries, electoral party lists assign both a primary legislator (propietario) and a substitute (suplente) to each legislative seat. When the propietario is unwilling to support the party line but willing to recuse himself from a vote, parties summon the corresponding suplente (Alvarenga, Samper interviews). Only in Mexico, where I interviewed only the president of the lower house and his staff, was there any reluctance to discuss mechanisms by which party discipline is enforced (Paoli interview).
The most common theme running through accounts of party discipline, by legislators across parties and systems, was control over career prospects. This is the bottom line resource that parties control, as legislators are acutely aware across the board. Alexis Sibaja, Costa Rica's minority party leader, sums it up: "There is party discipline because political careers in Costa Party rules say that on issues of national importance, the party organs decide and the bancada is subordinate to these decisions … The Sandinista national assembly decided to go ahead with this reform, and they gave us the chance to express our points of view. Afterward, we broke discipline. Then, according to the statutes, we could have been sanctioned with expulsion or other measures. This wasn't convenient to them, politically. So they ruled that whoever did not accept party decisions could not aspire to electoral posts. Everyone knew I wanted to run for mayor of Managua, and this way I couldn't be nominated. It's almost certain that they won't permit me to run for reelection as a deputy either. And they took other measures. I was Vice President of the Assembly's executive committee, and they took that away, and they won't let me chair any committees (Baltodano).
Baltodano correctly anticipated continued conflicts with party leaders over her aspirations. In December, facing public rebukes from party leaders for failing to support their chosen nominee for the 2001 presidential election, Baltodano noted that if she were in violation of party protocol, the FSLN was bound by its own statutes to expel her, "But they have not done that; therefore they These examples illustrate the most consistent theme in the interview responses regarding sources of party discipline -that parties have sanctioning mechanisms on the books, but except for in exceptional circumstances, less formal measures serve to induce discipline by appealing to legislators' career ambitions. (Carey and Shugart 1995) .
Individualistic voting and indiscipline
Legislators' personal preferences, as well as those induced by electoral pressures, can both explain voting indiscipline.
It is important to note, however, that whatever the motivation, making votes public increases the value to legislators of staking out an independent position. Recorded votes can serve as means for maverick legislators to "go public" over the heads of party leaders, and in so doing to establish reputations either among a target audience of supporters or perhaps nationally.
The rare decisions to hold nominales in systems where anonymous legislative voting is the norm can illustrate this. According to Costa Rican minority leader Sibaja:
One sign that there's going to be a nominal isn't that the opposition is divided -that's no problem. The problem is when the governing party is divided. There was a famous case here in the early 1970s, having to do with student protests over an agreement that permitted a transnational company to mine [in a wilderness area]. It was called the Alcoa Agreement. At that time, the PLN controlled the presidency and had a big parliamentary majority. One government deputy started the fight. That deputy himself later became president, but not as a member of the PLN -don Rodrigo Carazo Odio, who founded the Unity Party, which is governing currently. He led a group of PLN deputies to break the party line. I think that was the last time they used a nominal on an important issue, precisely because the the government's fracción divided at that moment. That was thirty years ago. It's not common. (Sibaja) Sibaja's account raises a couple of points. First, it suggests that public voting on the Alcoa Agreement was a mechanism for a deputy with national ambitions to draw a line in the sand between himself and his party's leadership. 13 The nominal signals a showdown, on which those who control the legislative agenda are determined to proceed to a vote even on matters sufficiently controversial that legislators are determined to go on record in opposition. These circumstances are rare in Costa Rica, where nominales must be requested by a majority vote (Reglamento Art.101), but rules of procedure present lower thresholds elsewhere, and no obstacle at all where votes are recorded as a matter of standard procedure. Electronic voting, therefore, should encourage independence in legislative voting -at least where the records are made public -both insofar as it provides party mavericks with a forum for position taking and insofar as it opens legislators to demands of accountability for their votes from actors outside the chamber (Bolanos interview). 14 The second important point of Sibaja's story is that governing and opposition parties differ on their proclivities to divide on legislative votes. This point was made by deputies in various parties, across countries, and warrants further development.
Executives as legislative coalition brokers
It is useful to distinguish sources of unity that operate at the systemic level from those that can vary across parties within legislatures. Among the former are constitutional rules and characteristics of electoral systems. It is widely held, for example, that party discipline is encouraged by parliamentary more than by presidential constitutions (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998) , and by closed list elections more than by other systems (Carey and Shugart 1995;  Baltodano interview). These sorts of institutional constraints operate on all parties in a legislature. Other factors affecting discipline, however, can vary across parties within legislatures. Parties on the outside of the ideological spectrum, for example, may be more disciplined than centrist parties (Mainwaring 1999; Best 1995) , or parties that are part of the governing coalition more than those in opposition (Laver and Schofield 1990; Amorim Neto 1999) . This last proposition echoes throughout the interviews with Latin American legislators. The Liberal bancada has been very obedient, through presidential discipline more than party discipline. They take almost no decisions autonomous from the president, and when they have, they've had to backtrack when it produces a presidential veto. One or another deputy has voted against the president's wishes, and then along comes some bit of patronage that makes him change his vote, and we vote again the way the president orders. When a party wins, the fracción generally forms a stronger connection to the executive. The strongest relationship is legislative fracción-executive, President of the Republic, ministers and all the apparatus of public administration. The losing fracción does not maintain much of a strong connection with its party either. Parties in this country are not strong ideological structures, such as would elicit discipline from each deputy. Parties at the national level have been converted into electoral platforms, more than the classical concept of an ideological bloc.
There is a consensus in the interview responses that presidents in these systems control resources that are highly valued by legislators, and that can be exchanged for legislative votes.
The interviews suggest that these transactions are easiest within parties, such that legislators from the president's party enjoy privileged, but not exclusive, access to the market for executive resources. Two things follow from this. First, legislative voting discipline should be higher in presidents' parties than in others. Second, all the accounts of presidential influence offered in the interviews rely on executive-legislative exchanges that would attract criticism if exposed to public scrutiny, which suggests that the presidential advantage might be mitigated by public voting.
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Survey data
Across the countries where I conducted interviews, legislators' accounts of the manner by which legislative voting coalitions are formed and the pressures to which they respond were remarkably similar. This is confirmed by data from the Proyecto de Elites Latinoamericanas project, which has surveyed legislators in various Latin American countries. Responses to relevant questions from 1998 surveys in Mexico, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica are shown in Figure 1 .
[ Figure 1a -c]
On the questions on the influence of party leaders and voters, all parties within each country exhibit consistent response patterns, acknowledging a substantial role for party leaders, but insisting more adamantly that district voters' preferences matter. With respect to executive influence, however, there are differences between deputies from governing versus opposition parties. In all three countries, almost all deputies from the president's party acknowledged considering the position of the government "A lot" or "Somewhat," whereas most deputies from the opposition selected "Little" or "Not at all." The disjuncture was more pronounced in Mexico and Nicaragua where, in 1998 when the surveys were conducted, opposition parties were slightly more inclined toward intransigence toward incumbent presidents than in Costa Rica. On the whole, the responses are remarkably similar across countries for each question.
The similarity in responses across cases is even more striking when legislators were asked whether the influence of party leaders over legislators should be increased, decreased, or left the same, as shown in Figure 2 . It is not surprising that legislators tend to favor their own discretion on the whole. The nearly identical distributions and the overwhelming support for weakened party leadership are both noteworthy, however, and they are consistent with the tenor of the reforms reviewed earlier in this essay, which support sacrificing party discipline for individual legislator flexibility.
[ Figure 2 ]
Movement toward legislative individualism?
Is there movement toward individual legislator accountability in Latin America, whether due to institutional reforms or other factors? This is hard to measure. The Elites parlamentarios data provide snapshots from 1998, but we lack survey data over time. In taking stock of the reforms themselves, one confronts similar challenges. The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution is too young to yield conclusions about whether its new provisions will alter the nature of legislative representation. 16 With respect to Latin America's mixed electoral systems, preliminary research indicates some changes. Even before Chavez's overhaul of the Venezuelan political system, SMD/PR elections generated legislators with distinctive perceptions of accountability. A majority of SMD deputies surveyed in 1997 claimed that citizens vote based on the personal characteristics of candidates, whereas over ninety percent of PR list deputies contended voters "think of politics in terms of parties" (Kulischek and Crisp 2001). In Bolivia, similarly, the mixed system has "produced two classes of deputies and two different parliamentary roles. In short, a trend toward locality-centered politics, constituency-serving 'retail politics' (and perhaps also corporative politics) has been strengthened at the expense of national politics" (Mayorga 2001b ).
Of the reforms discussed in this essay, public voting represents the most potentially farreaching on a couple of counts. First, the obstacles to public voting are less formidable than to constitutional or electoral reforms, increasing the prospects for its widespread adoption. Indeed, public voting has a stealth quality about it, insofar as it can be adopted under the guise of modernization and administrative efficiency, making objections to it difficult to defend publicly.
Second, public dissemination of voting records exposes individual legislators to pressures that may conflict with the edicts of party leaders, for whom legislative voting behavior is known in any case.
Quantitative analyses of recorded votes will make it possible to track the independence of individual legislators and the unity of party groups. Longitudinal analysis is currently limited in that electronic voting is a recent phenomenon, and data exist only for recent years, where they are available at all. 17 In the meantime, we can draw from legislator interviews a sense of public voting's impact on accountability.
The first matter is of the dogs that do not bark -legislatures that do not record votes.
Former Salvadoran Assembly Juan Duch (ARENA) explains that electronic vote recording machines are unnecessary because the composition of voting coalitions is self-evident:
"Basically all decisions are generated through committees where the political agreements, understandings, and consensus can be reached to arrive at a mathematical majority to pass a vote. Of course, we don't count with an electronic system, but it is still easy to know how a fracción voted, y therefore one can know with near certainty whether there is a majority, and whether it is a simple or extraordinary majority."
Duch does not even acknowledge the relevance of registering how individual legislators vote.
The unit that commands his attention is the fracción, reflecting his perspective as on of the legislative leaders who brokers the agreements to which he refers. His account is confirmed, but his judgment of it challenged, by Aristide Alvarenga (PDC), who describes how the handraising method allows leaders and their aides, who count hands from the front of the chamber, to ignore dissenting votes, overlook absences from the chamber, and manipulate outcomes (interview).
The same criticisms of anonymous voting were levied in Costa Rica and Venezuela, both chambers where electronic voting equipment has been installed, but where its use has been resisted by party leaders (Castillo, Guido, and Murillo interviews).
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In the Mexican Chamber of Deputies and Nicaragua's Assembly, electronic voting equipment has been installed and its use adopted as part of standard legislative procedure. In The truth is that, recently, yes. It's not a big issue. Voting is part of the electoral debate, but still not a central part. Because despite the fact that votes are recorded, they aren't widely known among the people, except when a particular issue becomes decisive at election time … It requires that the electorate, the political analysts, have the record. It's not so simple to create this record because it requires a certain infrastructure, a certain culture, a certain systematization. There's no independent center that keeps a record of the votes. In the United States, there is -there are lots that keep complete records of the details. That's more sophisticated. I think eventually we'll get there, but as of now it's not so easy. At the least, it's known when a certain deputy takes a certain position.
The changing nature of legislative accountability
This essay posits a basic trade-off between party discipline and local or sectoral particularism in legislative representation. I suggest that over the past decade, a number of factors have increased the sensitivity among legislators in Latin America to pressures other than the demands of national party leaders. It is important to acknowledge that even party leaders should not necessarily demand blind responsiveness to the national command on the part of their troops. Total failure by legislators to attend to local, sectoral, and even individual constituent demands can leave national leaders sitting atop organizations with no electoral support (Carey 1996) . This calculus by national leaders was responsible for the adoption of mixed-member electoral systems in Venezuela and Bolivia (Crisp and Rey 2001; Mayorga 2001a) . National party leaders pursuing such a strategy may parcel out reforms providing a modicum of individual flexibility while retaining other powers and resources that ensure discipline. Thus, for example, leaders of most Bolivian, Mexican, and Venezuelan parties have maintained centralized control over candidate nominations, seriously limiting the extent to which district pressures induce even SMD legislators to buck party discipline (Mayorga 2001b; Horcacitas and Weldon 2001b) . Similarly, leaders have been slow to make legislative voting records public in Argentina, Mexico, and Nicaraguaand even to use electronic voting machines where they are installed in Costa Rica, Peru, and Venezuela.
Despite these constraints, however, the overall trend is toward the exposure of legislators to increasing pressures from sources besides their parties. In the mixed-member systems, SMDs induce individual legislative entrepreneurship and constituency service. Moreover, other electoral reforms aimed at increasing voter discretion among candidates within parties, such as preference voting within lists and primary elections for candidate nominations, are being seriously considered in Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Venezuela, at least. These reforms are expected to increase the willingness of legislators to break party discipline in legislative voting Outside the realm of electoral reforms, the spread of public legislative voting, particularly through the technology of electronic voting, tips the balance between party and individual accountability toward the latter. In addition to the cases already reviewed here, the establishment of public voting is central to reform proposals pending before the Colombian Congress. Indeed, public voting is singled out as the most important reform available to increase the transparency of the legislative process in that country (Roland and Zapata 2000 ; see also Kugler and Rosenthal 2000) . The argument rests on the widely-held idea that political elites and ordinary citizens differ in their claims to anonymity in political action. Whereas voter anonymity, through the secret ballot, is a necessary condition for democratic elections, anonymity in legislative voting undermines democratic accountability. 21 The balance between party discipline and individual responsiveness among legislators in many Latin American countries has been, and continues to be, subject to pressures favoring individual responsiveness in recent years. Key institutional factors driving this trend are electoral reforms that increase voter discretion over individual candidates within parties, and procedural reforms that make legislative votes public. Other new measures included in the new Venezuelan constitution were adopted in the same spirit. Indeed, across countries, and with respect to different reform proposals, there is a distinct anti-discipline flavor in the rhetoric of reform. The rhetoric must be evaluated with a good deal of salt, given the inclination of politicians to pay lip service to responsiveness to the grassroots. Nevertheless, the substance of reforms has pushed in the same direction in important ways. Students of democratic performance should pay serious attention to evaluating the effects of this trend on legislative behavior. 
Reelection
• For the most part, do members of congress want reelection? Or do they aspire to other political positions? Or do they not aspire to continue on in public office?
• Por pura coincidencia, hace unos pocos anos, yo lei en un periodico en los EEUU que una compania norteamericana tuvo un contracto para installar maquinas electrónicas de votación en el senado venezolano. Tenia razon? Las usaban? Que de la Camara de Diputados --tenian maquinas de votación electronicas?
En la ANC, hicieron muchas votaciones nominales? (Yo vi a una mediadocena en el sitio de internet, pero todos casi consensual, con unos 4 o 5 constituyentes en oposición, pero no mas.)
Tengo interes en este asunto porque, en el nombre de la modernizacion, se installaron maquinas asi en el congreso peruano hace unos dos anos. Al primer, no las usaban. Pero eventualmente, un grupo de diputados (del gobierno y de la oposición) puso el argumento que se debe usarlas para todas las votaciones para aumentar la transparencia del proceso legislativo. Desde el ano pasado, no solamente se hacen todas las votaciones electrónicamente, sino se ponen en el sitio congresional de internet casi inmediatamente. Se ha desaparecido, efectivamente, la distinción entre las votaciones economicas y las nominales. Se usa el mismo sistema -de votación electrónica y de publicación en el internet -en Brazil y en Chile. Y se han installado maquinas electrónicas en Nicaragua recientemente tambien. Cree que es posible el uso de un sistema semejante en el nuevo Congreso venezolano?
Que otros cambios, cree Usted, se va a desarollar en el nuevo Congreso en:
• la organización del proceso legislativo?
• la funcion de los partidos legislativos?
• el sistema de comisiones?
Habran cambios importantes en las relaciones entre el Congreso y el ejecutivo que resultaran de la nueva Constitucion?
Cree Usted que el nuevo Congreso va a ser una institución mas importante al proceso político que en la epoca anterior, o menos?
• Va a tener mas autonomia frente el ejecutivo, o menos?
• Vinculado mejor a los ciudadanos, o menos?
Los periodicos indican que el proceso de nominar candidatos de gobernador al nivel estatal ha fomentado divisiones entre el Polo Patriótico, no es verdad?
• Que pasa con las nominaciones legislativas?
• Se va a nominar solamente un candidato la coalición en cada circunscripción uninominal?
• Solamente una planchita coalicional en cada circunscripción plurinominal?
• Como se decide cuales candidatos se incluyen?
• Es mas decentralizado que en la epoca anterior el proceso de nominar? Mas democratico?
La reforma electoral de 1989, que establecio las circunscripciones legislativas uninominalesmejoro la responsabilidad de los representantes a los ciudadanos, o no?
• Si no, porque no? 
